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ADDING (OR REAFFIRMING) A TEMPORAL
ELEMENT TO THE MIRANDA WARNING "YOU
HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY"
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a suspect sitting in a police station interrogation room
mentally preparing himself for questioning. Prior to questioning, a
police officer reads the suspect the standard Miranda warnings off of a
card, which include the "right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."1 While
the right to remain silent and the warning that the suspect's statements
can be used against him are easily understood, the declaration that the
defendant has the right to the presence of an attorney is not. At best,
this warning is ambiguous, as the right to an attorney could apply
before, during, or after interrogation; at worst, this warning is
misleading. The Miranda warnings are intended to protect a suspect's
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination;2 however,
the vagueness of the "right to the presence of an attorney" combined
with the intensity of the interrogation often render the suspect's Fifth
Amendment privilege illusory.
The United States Supreme Court has determined the number and
specificity of warnings that a law enforcement official is required to give
to a suspect by balancing the competing interests of law enforcement
and suspects. On the one hand, custodial interrogation provides law
enforcement officials with a valuable opportunity to obtain confessions
and inculpatory statements, which help to secure convictions. On the
other hand, a suspect must be made aware of his rights so that he can
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if he
chooses to. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court considered these
competing interests and declared that the Fifth Amendment includes
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
2. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person . .. shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
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the right to have counsel present during interrogation and that a suspect
must be made aware of this right.3
Currently, however, the circuit courts are divided on whether the
Fifth Amendment and Miranda require Miranda warnings to include an
express reference to the right to have an attorney present during
interrogation in order for statements to be admissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Several circuits hold that the standard
warning, which warns the suspect only of the general right to an
attorney, is constitutionally adequate, while other circuits require an
explicit reference to the right to consult with an attorney during
interrogation.4 At the outset, it is worth noting that this Comment in no
way seeks to minimize the importance of confessions and statements
made by a suspect during interrogation; such statements and confessions
are a vital part of the criminal justice system. Instead, this Comment
advocates that the Miranda warnings should be clear, comprehendible,
and should alert the suspect of his constitutionally protected rights. The
legitimacy of the criminal justice system rests, in part, on the process of
interrogation being conducted in a civilized manner. As one scholar
commented, "The quality of a nation's civilization can be largely
measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal
law."5
This Comment contends that both the Fifth Amendment and
Miranda dictate that a suspect must be explicitly made aware of the
right to have an attorney present during interrogation. Part II discusses
the guidance that Miranda and its progeny provide with respect to the
right to have counsel present during interrogation. Part III gives an
overview of the circuit split and points out that several circuits have
conflicting precedent on the issue. Part IV argues that the specific
warning is necessary to adequately protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment
right against compelled self-incrimination. Part V proposes a bright-line
rule, which states that if the accused is not made aware of the right to
have an attorney present during interrogation, all statements made will
be inadmissible. This Part concludes that the Supreme Court and other
courts should adopt this rule and require a temporal element as part of
the right-to-an-attorney warning because it will benefit the police, the
courts, and the suspects. This Part also asserts that if the Supreme
3. See infra Part II.A.
4. See infra Part III.A.
5. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 480 (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956)).
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Court does not adopt this rule, law enforcement officials should
nonetheless alert suspects of their right to have an attorney present
during interrogation to increase the likelihood of having confessions
deemed admissible without fearing that more suspects will invoke their
right to consult with an attorney.
II. SUPREME COURT CASES AND THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY'S
PRESENCE DURING INTERROGATION
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court put procedural
safeguards in place to protect an individual's Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination.6 Since the Court handed down
this landmark decision, Miranda has been on a turbulent rollercoaster
ride in which it has seen its protections whittled down and then
bolstered. The following Part provides a brief overview of the Miranda
decision, focusing on the right to have an attorney present during
interrogation, and then discusses the decisions that have affected this
right.
A. Miranda v. Arizona: The High Watermark
The decision of Miranda v. Arizona established the high watermark
of protections that law enforcement officials must provide to a suspect
prior to custodial interrogation.' According to the Court, the
protections are not only necessary to protect against the inherent evils
of custodial interrogation, they are mandated by the Constitution.8 The
Miranda Court discussed various techniques used by police officers
during interrogation that make interrogation an inherently coercive
6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Prior to Miranda, the Court used the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee procedural fairness in the interrogation process.
See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
286 (1936). In applying the Due Process Clause to custodial interrogations, the Court sought
to ensure that all confessions were made voluntarily by looking to the "totality of the
circumstances." Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957). The overarching question in
each case was "whether a defendant's will was overborne [by interrogators] at the time he
confessed." Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961). In 1964, two years before Miranda, the
Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination into the
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibited the states from infringing upon this constitutional
right. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6. Incorporation of the Fifth Amendment set the stage for the
Court to further expand the Fifth Amendment privilege.
7. Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121,
1121 (2001).
8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-58, 460; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,
439 n.4 (2000) (citing the constitutional references to the Fifth Amendment in Miranda).
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situation, 9 and then declared that such practices are "at odds with one of
our Nation's most cherished principles-that the individual may not be
compelled to incriminate himself."' Expounding upon this principle,
the Court stated:
[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect a government-state or federal-must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens....
[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that
the government seeking to punish an individual produce
the evidence against him by its own independent labors,
rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling
it from his own mouth.1 1
While the Court recognized that statements and confessions obtained
during interrogation are vital components of the American criminal
justice system, the Court also recognized that suspects must be afforded
certain constitutional protections so that their rights are not trampled
upon. "
To protect a suspect's right to remain silent and right not to
incriminate himself, the Court required two procedural safeguards: the
warnings, which make the suspect aware of his rights, and a valid waiver
of the rights.'3 The Court set forth a list of warnings that a suspect
subjected to custodial interrogation" must be made aware of prior to
any questioning, which are: "the right to remain silent, that anything
[the suspect] says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires."' 5 The Court did not go so far as to require a verbatim reading
of these warnings, but stated that either this list of warnings or the "fully
effective equivalent" is a prerequisite for admissibility of any statements
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449-53. The various techniques include isolating the suspect so
that he is deprived of every psychological advantage, treating the suspect's guilt as a fact, and
inducing confessions through trickery. Id.
10. Id. at 457-58.
11. Id. at 460 (citing Chambers, 309 U.S. at 235-38) (internal citation omitted).
12. Id. at 478-79.
13. Id. at 479.
14. Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." Id. at 444.
15. Id. at 479.
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made by the suspect.16 After the warnings are recited, the suspect must
be given an opportunity to exercise his rights, and, if he chooses not to,
he may then "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" waive the rights
and answer questions. 7  The Miranda Court held that unless
interrogators comply with these safeguards, the evidence obtained from
the interrogation cannot be used as evidence against the suspect.8
In another part of the opinion, the Court further expounded upon
the Fifth Amendment right to an attorney and declared that a suspect
has the right to have counsel present during custodial questioning.' 9 The
Court deemed the right to have an attorney present during interrogation
"indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment
privilege.... "'0 Accordingly, the Court held:
fAin individual held for interrogation must be clearly
informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation ....
[T]his warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.
No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person
may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in
its stead. Only through such a warning is there
ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of
this right.2'
Despite the Court's declaration that this warning is an "absolute
prerequisite" to questioning, subsequent decisions of the Court have not
strictly followed this language.
B. The Subsequent Fall and Rise of Miranda
A few years after Miranda was handed down, the Court began
limiting the scope of the exclusionary remedy set forth in Miranda in
situations where law enforcement officials failed to comply with the
proper warnings.22  In Harris v. New York, the Court held that
16. Id. at 476.
17. Id. at 444, 479.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 469.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added).
22. The Miranda Court stated that "unless and until [the] warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against [the suspect]." Id. at 479.
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statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used to impeach a
defendant if he took the stand, even though the statements could not be
used in the prosecution's case-in-chief.' Similarly in Michigan v.
Tucker, the Court held that the testimony of a witness was admissible
even though the police learned the identity of the witness from a
statement taken in violation of Miranda. Specifically, the police learned
the identity of a witness during the defendant's custodial interrogation
without advising the defendant that he was entitled to court appointed
counsel. 24  Despite the clear Miranda violation, the Court did not
require suppression of the witness's testimony because it reasoned that
the police conduct did not infringe upon the defendant's constitutional
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.2' In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Rehnquist divorced the Miranda warnings from their
constitutional underpinnings by stating that the warnings were not
explicitly mandated by the Constitution, but were merely "prophylactic
rules" developed to protect the right against compelled self-
incrimination.26 Moreover, the decision highlighted that the Miranda
warnings "were not intended to create a 'constitutional
straightjacket.' ' 27 Both Harris and Tucker created significant incentives
for the police to give inadequate Miranda warnings because statements
obtained in violation of Miranda could still be used to dissuade a
defendant from testifying at trial, and could be used to lead the officers
to evidence that would be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
28
A few years after Tucker, the Court reiterated that a suspect must be
made aware of his right to have counsel present during interrogation. In
Fare v. Michael C., the Court stated: "The rule the Court established in
Miranda is clear. In order to be able to use statements obtained during
custodial interrogation of the accused, the State must warn the accused
prior to such questioning . . . of his right to have counsel, retained or
appointed, present during interrogation., 29  While this passage
demonstrates that the Court requires a suspect to be made aware of his
right to have counsel present during interrogation, the holding in Fare
23. 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
24 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 436 (1974). The interrogation occurred before the
Miranda decision, but under Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), Miranda was
applicable. Tucker, 417 U.S. 435.
25. Id. at 446, 448-49.
26. Id. at 439, 444.
27. Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436, 467).
28. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 111 (1998).
29. 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979).
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did not validate the importance of this right. Fare held that a juvenile's
request to speak to his probation officer was not a per se invocation of
his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. °  Nonetheless, the Court
recognized the clarity with which the Miranda Court spoke with regard
to the right to have an attorney present during interrogation.
The Court reinforced the protections provided by Miranda and
validated the significance of an attorney's presence during interrogation
in Edwards v. Arizona." In Edwards, the Court held that if a suspect
invokes his right to have counsel present during interrogation,
questioning must stop immediately and cannot resume until the suspect
is provided counsel, or the suspect initiates communication with the
police officers.32 This holding elevated the constitutional status of the
warning that the suspect has a right to have counsel present during
interrogation, and demonstrated that the Court was willing to uphold
and protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
Shortly after the Court elevated the status of the right to have
counsel present during interrogation, the Court trivialized the
importance of the precise wording of the Miranda warnings. In
California v. Prysock, the Court pointed out that it "has never indicated
that the 'rigidity' of Miranda extends to the precise formulation of the
warnings given a criminal defendant.... Miranda itself indicated that no
talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures., 33  The
defendant in Prysock was told of his right to have counsel present
before and during questioning, and of his right to have an attorney
appointed if he could not afford one; however, the officer did not give
the warnings in the exact order that is laid out in the Miranda opinion.34
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate District of California
suppressed the defendant's statements based on this error and ordered a
new trial.35 Reversing the state court decision, the Court held that the
order in which the warnings were given was not of constitutional
significance because the substance of the warnings was conveyed 6
30. Id. at 724.
31. 451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981).
32. Id. at 485. The Court clarified Edwards in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990). In Minnick, the Court held that once a suspect requests counsel, law enforcement
officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present even if the suspect has
already communicated with counsel. Minncick, 498 U.S. at 154.
33. 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981) (per curium).
34. Id. at 356-57.
35. Id. at 358.
36. Id. at 361.
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Although the deviation from the standard Miranda warnings in Prysock
was fairly benign, this case set the stage for further erosion of the
Miranda protections.
Within the five years following Prysock, the Court handed down
several decisions that continued to chip away at the core of the Miranda
warnings. First, in New York v. Quarles, the Court established a "public
safety" exception to Miranda.7 Under this exception, the police are
free to forgo the warnings if doing so will help protect the public from
danger.3 8 Afraid this exception would lead the Court down a slippery
slope that would result in numerous exceptions to the Miranda
warnings, Justice Marshall commented in dissent:
By finding on these facts justification for unconsented
interrogation, the majority abandons the clear guidelines
enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, and condemns the
American judiciary to a new era of post hoc inquiry into
the propriety of custodial interrogations. . . . [T]he
majority has abandoned the rule that brought 18 years of
doctrinal tranquility to the field of custodial
interrogations. As the majority candidly concedes ... a
public-safety exception destroys forever the clarity of
Miranda for both law enforcement officers and members
of the judiciary.39
Justice Marshall proved to be right, because after Quarles, the Court
continued to legitimize police behavior that violated the letter and spirit
of the Miranda opinion.
In Oregon v. Elstad,4' for example, the Court declined to apply the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine 41 to a confession made after
proper Miranda warnings were given, even though the defendant made
a previous statement without receiving any warnings." According to the
Court, the initial, unwarned statement, given in the defendant's living
room, was made voluntarily and was unaccompanied by any coercion or
37. 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
38. Id. at 656.
39. Id. at 674, 679 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
40. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
41. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine provides that evidence discovered through
an illegal search or through other unconstitutional means will not be admissible in court. See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
42. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17.
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other deceitful tactics. 3 In holding that the initial Miranda violation did
not taint the subsequent confession, the Court emphasized again that
the Miranda rules were prophylactic in nature, rather than
constitutionally mandated." In Quarles and Elstad, the Court
eviscerated the core of the Miranda holding by "minimiz[ing] the cost of
neglecting to warn suspects of their rights.4 5
The Court continued to whittle away at the Miranda protections in
Duckworth v. Eagan.' The issue in Duckworth was whether Miranda
warnings were constitutionally inadequate when the defendant was told
the right to court-appointed counsel did not attach until he went to
court.47 The police officer told the defendant that he had the right to
have counsel present before and during interrogation but that appointed
counsel could only be provided "if and when you go to court. 48 These
warnings essentially deprived the indigent defendant of his right to have
counsel present before and during interrogation, yet the Court held the
warnings to be adequate because they "touched all of the bases required
by Miranda.' ' 49 It should be noted that while Prysock and Duckworth
did not require a verbatim reading of the warnings as laid out in
Miranda, both of the warnings given in these cases included the warning
that the accused has the right to have counsel present during
interrogation.'
Recently, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional status of the
Miranda decision in Dickerson v. United States.5 In an opinion written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a longtime critic of Miranda,52 the Court
held that because Miranda announced a constitutional rule, it could not
be overruled by an act of Congress. 3 Most importantly, the opinion
43. Id. at 300-01, 315.
44. Id. at 305, 309.
45. Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 518
(2002) (referring to New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984)).
46. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
47. Id. at 200-01.
48. Id. at 198.
49. Id. at 200, 203.
50. Id. at 198; California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 335, 356 (1981).
51. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Prior to Dickerson, the constitutional underpinnings of
Miranda had been seriously questioned. See generally Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was
it Overruled, Or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461 (1998) (explaining the many
qualifications and exceptions to Miranda).
52. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinions in Michigan v. Tucker and Duckworth
v. Eagan; he also joined the majority opinions in Fare v. Michael C. and Oregon v. Elstad.
53. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. The Act of Congress at issue was the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3501. The relevant part of this
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rebuked language from prior cases that indicated Miranda was merely a
set of prophylactic rules, ' and that it was not intended to create a
"constitutional straightjacket. '5 5 Dickerson was the culmination of the
Court's thirty-plus year struggle with its role in regulating police conduct
in that it reaffirmed Miranda's constitutional status 6 and "[gave] it a
permanent place in [the Court's] jurisprudence."57
Dickerson provided the Court with the momentum it needed to
further bolster the Miranda protections. In Missouri v. Siebert, the
Court held that warnings given mid-interrogation, after the suspect gave
an unwarned confession, were ineffective and the subsequently repeated
confession was therefore inadmissible.59 The interrogating police officer
in this case followed a technique laid out in national police manuals,
which instructed officers to withhold Miranda warnings until obtaining a
confession. 60 After the suspect gave a confession, pursuant to the
technique, the officer would then give the warnings and ask the suspect
to repeat the information he had already told the officer. 6  The State
argued the confession should be admitted into evidence because the
technique complied with the "question-first strategy" that the Court
approved in Elstad.62  As stated above, Elstad held that an initial,
inadvertent failure to administer the Miranda warnings did not taint a
subsequent confession given after proper warnings were administered
and a valid waiver was obtained.63 The Court distinguished Siebert from
bill provided that the admissibility of statements made by a suspect during interrogation
depended on whether the statements were made voluntarily, rather than on whether the
proper Miranda warnings were given. Id. Although this statute attempted to overrule
Miranda and restore the voluntariness test, the Department of Justice refused to implement
it, and therefore, the statute never achieved its intended effect. United States v. Dickerson,
166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled by 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
54. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438.
55. Id. at 440 n.6.
56. Id. at 444; see also Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson
to. .., 99 MIcH. L. REV. 879, 888-89 (2001); Weisselberg, supra note 7, at 1121.
57. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. But see United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634 (2004) (holding, in a three Justice
plurality decision, failure to give suspect Miranda warnings does not require suppression of
physical fruits of suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760 (2003) (holding officer's failure to read Miranda warnings to suspect prior to questioning
did not violate suspect's constitutional rights, and thus could not be grounds for § 1983
action).
59. 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004).
60. Id. at 604-05.
61. Id. at 606, 609.
62. Id. at 614.
63. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
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Elstad on the grounds that the technique used in Siebert intentionally
deprived the suspect of his Miranda rights whereas the situation in
Elstad was a "good-faith Miranda mistake." 64  The Court recognized
that the State attempted to manipulate the Elstad holding and
undermine the Miranda protections, and in the process, the Court
upheld the core value of the Miranda decision-preventing police from
obtaining coerced statements and confessions.
In the wake of Dickerson and Siebert, the constitutional safeguards
from Miranda have been re-legitimized, setting the stage for the Court
to resolve the circuit split regarding whether interrogators must warn a
suspect of his right to have counsel present during interrogation.
III. CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. A Split of Authority
Although Miranda and its progeny indicate that a suspect subjected
to custodial interrogation must be informed of his right to have counsel
present during interrogation, not merely of the right to have an attorney,
the circuits are split on whether this explicit warning is required. The
Second,65 Fourth,6 Seventh,67 and Eighth 68 Circuits hold Miranda
warnings adequately protect a suspect's right against compelled self-
incrimination without warning the suspect of his right to have counsel
present during interrogation. In contrast, the Fifth,69 Sixth,70 Ninth,71
64. Siebert, 542 U.S. at 614-15.
65. United States v. Burns, 684 F.2d 1066, 1074-75 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 375-77 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378, 380 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1968).
66. United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1996).
67. United States v. Arman, No. 04C6617, 2006 WL 293907, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Feb 2,
2006) (recognizing that the Seventh Circuit does not require a suspect to be explicitly warned
of his right to have counsel present during interrogation); see also United States v. Adams,
484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (7th Cir.
1973).
68. United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 503 (8th Cir. 1992); see infra notes 99-109
and accompanying text.
69. Sanchez v. Beto, 467 F.2d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1972); Windsor v. United States, 389
F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1968); Montoya v. United States, 392 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir. 1968);
Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968); Chambers v. United States, 391
F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir. 1968); see infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
70. United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 141 (6th Cir. 1992).
71. United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Noti,
731 F.2d 610, 614-15 (9th Cir. 1984).
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and Tenth72 Circuits hold that Miranda requires the suspect to be
explicitly warned that he has the right to have counsel present during
interrogation.73
The source of the circuit split is the different variations of the
warning for the Fifth Amendment right to counsel that the Miranda
decision sets forth. When the Court is laying out the total package of
warnings that must be given, the warning is phrased as the "right to the
presence of an attorney., 74  Yet, when the Court is specifically
discussing the importance of an attorney's presence during
interrogation, the Court unequivocally states that the suspect "must be
clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to
have the lawyer with him during interrogation .... [T]his warning is an
absolute prerequisite to interrogation.,
75
Further complicating the issue is the unclear post-Miranda Supreme
Court precedent. On the one hand, in Fare v. Michael C., the Court
stated in dicta, "The rule the Court established in Miranda is clear. In
order to be able to use statements obtained during custodial
interrogation of the accused, the State must warn the accused prior to
such questioning... of his right to have counsel, retained or appointed,
present during interrogation.7 6 Yet, on the other hand, in several cases,
such as Prysock and Duckworth, the Court emphasized that there is not
one set of certified or official warnings.77 Whether a circuit requires an
express reference to the right to consult with an attorney during
interrogation often depends on which part of Miranda and which
Supreme Court precedent the circuit relies on.
Not surprisingly, those circuits requiring the specific warning rely
heavily on the Miranda passage that states "an individual held for
interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult
with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
72. United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 673-74 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Oliver, 421 F.2d 1034, 1038 (10th Cir. 1970).
73. See Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Necessity That Miranda Warnings Include
Express Reference to Right to Have Attorney Present During Interrogation, 77 A.L.R. FED.
123 (1986) (compiling cases).
74. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 479 (1966).
75. Id. at 471.
76. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717 (1979).




interrogation ... ,,78 For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in United States v. Noti, relying on this passage, declared "[t]he right to
have counsel present during questioning is meaningful. Advisement of
this right is not left to the option of the police; it is mandated by the
Constitution. ' ' 79  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that advising the
suspect that he could consult with an attorney "at anytime" did not
comply with the above-cited directive from Miranda.s°
Conversely, circuits holding that the general warning is sufficient
rely heavily on language from Supreme Court precedent which states
that no "talismanic incantation"'8 of the warnings is necessary and that
the Miranda warnings do not require a "precise formulation." 2
Moreover, these circuits believe that the general warning implies the
specific warning, and therefore, the explicit warning of the right to have
counsel present during interrogation is unnecessary." For example, in
United States v. Cusumano, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that even though neither defendant was explicitly warned of his right to
have an attorney present during interrogation, "such an inference
[could] readily be drawn." '
B. Intra-Circuit Conflict
As laid out above, the circuits are split on whether a suspect must be
warned of his right to have counsel present during an interrogation.
Within two of these circuits, there are directly conflicting opinions, thus,
making the law in these circuits unclear and drawing attention to the
uncertainty of the law in this area.
78. See, e.g., United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966)); Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968)
(same).
79. Noti, 731 F.2d at 615.
80. Atwell, 398 F.2d at 510 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471); see also Windsor v. United
States, 389 F.2d 530, 532, 533 (5th Cir. 1968) (telling a suspect "he could speak to an
attorney.., before he said anything" was not the same as telling the suspect of his right to
have counsel present during interrogation, and therefore, the warning was inadequate).
81. United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981)); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 501-02 (8th Cir.
1992) (same).
82. Frankson, 83 F.3d at 81 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361); Caldwell, 954 F.2d at 501
(quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359).
83. See Frankson, 83 F.3d at 82 ("[The suspect's] right to an attorney began immediately
and continued forward in time without qualification.").
84. 429 F.2d 378, 379 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[The agent warned defendants they were] entitled
to an attorney to be present while they make any statements.").
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The most recent case to shed light on this circuit split, Bridgers v.
Dretke, came out of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and created
intra-circuit conflict.85 Prior to Bridgers, the Fifth Circuit had held that a
suspect must be explicitly warned of his right to have counsel present
during interrogation. 6 In Bridgers, however, the defendant was read his
Miranda warnings from a card issued by the Fort Lauderdale Police
Department, which, among other warnings, stated, "You have the right
to the presence of an attorney/lawyer prior to any questioning." ' Both
the warnings and the subsequent confession were tape-recorded." The
confession was admitted into evidence, over objection, and Bridgers was
convicted of capital murder in a state jury trial and sentenced to death:
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and
sentence. 89 The state appellate court recognized that Miranda requires a
suspect to be made aware of his right to have counsel present during
interrogation, but held that the warnings given to Bridgers adequately
conveyed this right to him, and therefore, complied with Miranda.90
Bridgers then appealed the decision to the United States Supreme
Court but the Court denied certiorari; however, Justices Breyer,
Stevens, and Souter issued a statement with the denial. 9' In the
statement, the Justices observed, "the warnings given here say nothing
about the lawyer's presence during interrogation. For that reason, they
apparently leave out an essential Miranda element."
Bridgers next petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern
District of Texas, but was denied relief and appealed. 9  Because
Bridgers sought habeas relief after the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, like the district court, reviewed the writ under
a very deferential standard of review.94 Under the deferential standard
85. 431 F.3d 853, 860 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 2961 (2006).
86. Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1968); Atwell v. United States,
398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968).
87. Bridgers, 431 F.3d at 856.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 856-57.
90. Id. at 857-58, 860 n.5.
91. Bridgers v. Texas, 532 U.S. 1034 (2001).
92. Id.
93. Bridgers v. Livingston, No. 100CV724, 2005 WL 3683735, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30,
2005).
94. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a federal
court cannot overturn a decision of a state court unless the state court's decision:
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of review, the Fifth Circuit upheld the denial of writ on the grounds that
the Texas court's holding was not "objectively unreasonable."95
Further complicating the Fifth Circuit's decision, the court stated in
a footnote that its prior precedent holding that a suspect must be
explicitly warned of the right to have counsel during custodial
interrogation remained binding precedent." According to the court, the
prior precedent remained binding because it was subjected to a de novo
review, while the Bridgers case was reviewed pursuant to AEDPA.97 If
this case leaves you confused, you are not alone; one commentator
noted, "This decision is about as clear as mud.,
98
The precedent from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is also
about as clear as mud. In United States v. Caldwell, the Eighth Circuit
upheld Miranda warnings that stated you have the "right to an
attorney." 99 The court reviewed the warnings under the deferential
plain-error doctrine, rather than de novo review because the defendant
did not properly preserve the issue of the adequacy of the Miranda
warnings for appeal.1°° Whether this standard of review dictated the
outcome is not entirely clear. Nonetheless, the court stated that the
warnings the detective gave to the defendant complied with Miranda,
Duckworth, and Prysock, leading one to believe that the court probably
would have upheld the warnings even under a de novo review.
In dissent, Chief Judge Lay blasted the majority opinion for
overriding the law of the circuit without an en banc decision. 1 Chief
Judge Lay argued that the Eighth Circuit, in South Dakota v. Long, had
already settled the issue of whether a suspect must be explicitly warned
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
95. Bridgers, 431 F.3d at 860.
96. Id. at 860 n.6.
97. Id.
98. Pamela A. MacLean, 5th Circuit 'Miranda' Case Muddies the Waters, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1137492308952 (quoting
Karyl Krug, a federal habeas practitioner in Austin, Texas, and former Texas deputy attorney
general).
99. 954 F.2d 496, 502 (8th Cir. 1992).
100. Id. at 500-01.
101. Id. at 510 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
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of his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation in
favor of requiring the warning."°c In Long, a sheriff warned the
defendant "he did not have to say anything and that he had a right to an
attorney. ' 1°3 The Long court held that the "warnings [were] inadequate
[because] the accused, although advised he had the right to an attorney,
was not advised that 'he had the right to the presence of an attorney and
that, if he could not afford one, a lawyer could be appointed to
represent him prior to any questioning.'"04 Chief Judge Lay quoted this
passage and declared that the Eighth Circuit requires a suspect to be
warned of the right to have counsel present during interrogation; 5
however, the majority in Caldwell did not believe Long settled the
issue. 6
The Caldwell majority, instead, relied on another Eighth Circuit
decision, Evans v. Swenson, for the proposition that it has never
required a suspect to be made explicitly aware of his right to have
counsel present before and during questioning.' °7 In Evans, the police
officer warned the suspect, among other warnings, "You have a right to
make a phone call and you also have a right to an attorney."10 8 The
Evans court held that this warning complied with the substance of
Miranda because it suggested to the suspect his right to have counsel
before and during questioning.1"
Whether Long or Evans actually settled the issue of whether a
suspect must be explicitly warned of his right to have an attorney
present during interrogation is not clear, either from the cases
themselves, or from the court's later interpretations of them. If
Caldwell had been reviewed de novo would Long, instead of Evans,
have been considered controlling? No one knows. What is clear,
however, is that the intra-circuit conflicts in the Fifth and the Eighth
circuits and the overall circuit split beg the Supreme Court to speak with
clarity on this issue.
102. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Long, 465 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1972)).
103. Long, 465 F.2d at 68. The court pointed out that the defendant was never advised
of his right to have counsel appointed or that he had the right to remain silent. Id.
104. Id. at 70 (citing Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 163 (9th Cir. 1969)).
105. Caldwell, 954 F.2d at 510 (Lay, C.J. dissenting) (quoting Long, 465 F.2d at 70).
106. Id. at 503 n.10 (majority opinion).
107. Id. at 502 (citing Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1972)).
108. Evans, 455 F.2d at 295.
109. Caldwell, 954 F.2d at 502 (citing Evans, 455 F.2d at 295).
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IV. THE NEED FOR THE EXTRA WARNING
A. The Importance of Counsel
The Miranda Court highlighted several important Fifth Amendment
functions that are served by an attorney's presence during interrogation.
First, the presence of an attorney "enable[s] the defendant under
otherwise compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear,
effectively, and in a way that eliminates the evils in the interrogation
process."" °  Second, the presence of an attorney ensures that the
statements made are given voluntarily and are not the product of
coercion."' Third, the presence of an attorney limits the possibility that
the police will abuse their authority (and if they do abuse their
authority, the attorney will be able to alert the court of the
misconduct). 1 2  Essentially, an attorney ensures that a suspect's
statements are made voluntarily, that a suspect has the ability to invoke
his right to remain silent, and that the interrogation process is conducted
in a way that complies with the Fifth Amendment privilege. " 3
The explicit warning that the suspect is entitled to have counsel
present during interrogation is extremely important because counsel
serves as the gatekeeper to a suspect's rights. As the Court stated in
Fare v. Michael C., "[T]he lawyer is the one person to whom society as a
whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of [a] person in his
dealings with the police and the courts.""' 4 A suspect will most likely
have a difficult time protecting his right against compelled self-
incrimination when interrogators are attempting to induce him to waive
the privilege; so, having an attorney present to advocate for the
suspect's rights will give the privilege substance and force. Take, for
example, the right to remain silent; when a suspect is brought in for
questioning and he is told that he has the right to remain silent, the
suspect will have difficulty believing that he, in fact, has this right. As
one commentator noted, "To remain silent in a police interview room in
the face of determined questioning by an officer with legitimate
authority to carry on this activity requires an abnormal exercise of
110. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1996).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 470.
113. Id. at 466.
114. 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
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will.' ' 15  However, if the suspect has counsel present during
interrogation, the right to remain silent now becomes a legitimate
option. Although the same can be said of the right to the presence of an
attorney-that the suspect will have a difficult time invoking the right-
adding the words "during interrogation" to the warning at least helps to
clarify the right and make the suspect aware of it.
Professor Mark Godsey argues that the role the Miranda Court
envisioned for an attorney during interrogation has not been born out in
practice and that the right-to-counsel warning should be dropped
because it is superfluous.11 6 He is not alone, as many commentators
have observed that the practical effect of a suspect invoking his right to
counsel is termination of the interrogation."7 Law enforcement officers
frequently terminate interrogation when a suspect invokes his right to
counsel because they are aware that if an attorney is present, the
attorney will probably advise his client to remain silent. '18 As a result,
officers prefer to terminate an interview when a suspect invokes his
right to counsel rather than go through the process of obtaining a lawyer
for an indigent suspect or waiting for retained counsel to arrive.119
While the commentators are probably correct to assert that the
invocation of counsel often results in termination of questioning, as this
assertion is demonstrated through empirical research, 2 ° this does not
prove Professor Godsey's argument that the suspect need not be made
aware of the right to have an attorney present.121
The point of the Miranda warnings is to protect a suspect's Fifth
Amendment right against being forced to give incriminating statements.
If the suspect invokes his right to counsel and the interrogation
terminates, the suspect is not being forced to incriminate himself and the
warnings are serving their purpose. Moreover, the warning of the right
to have counsel present during interrogation provides the suspect
115. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS
AND TESTIMONY 59 (1992) (quoting 2 BARRIE IRVING, ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. PROC.,
forward to POLICE INTERROGATION: A CASE STUDY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 153 (1980)).
116. Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 797-99, 813-14 (2006).
117. Id. at 797-98 nn.74-75 (compiling sources).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 797-99.
120. Id. at 798 n.75 (citing Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 266, 276-78 (1996)).
121. It should be noted that Professor Godsey's proposal is not intended to limit a
suspect's rights, but rather is intended to incorporate and reflect current police practices and
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 783.
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another avenue to invoke his privilege; 122 invoking the right to remain
silent may seem too difficult to do, but invoking the right to an attorney
may be less intimidating. 23 Further, a suspect garners extra protections
when he invokes his right to counsel. In accordance with Edwards v.
Arizona, when a suspect requests counsel, questioning cannot resume
until counsel is provided or the suspect initiates communication.
121
Professor Godsey recognizes that some benefits may be derived
from the warning, but argues that the "coercion-lessening benefits" are
"minimal or speculative at best."'" Nonetheless, the actual benefits that
are derived from the warning tip the scales in favor of its inclusion.
Moreover, even if the benefits are speculative, overturning forty years of
case law by eliminating a warning that is a Miranda fixture is a very
drastic and unnecessary measure. In sum, even if counsel's presence
during interrogation is not playing out in practice as the Miranda Court
envisioned, the warning for this right is still protecting the suspect's Fifth
Amendment privilege, and therefore is important and necessary.
Along this line of reasoning, each Miranda warning does not
necessarily have independent significance in and of itself, but rather the
package of warnings is intended to convey to the suspect that he does
not have to talk if he does not desire to. The attorney's presence is only
a means to an end, not an end in itself like the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 26  In other words, an attorney's presence during
interrogation gives the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-
incrimination meaning by safeguarding the suspect's right to remain
silent. For example, during interrogation, an attorney may advise his
client to selectively answer questions, or advise his client not to answer
any questions. Therefore, the Miranda warnings are not a "bundle of
sticks" that can be separated; rather, the warnings are inseparable and
122. Id. at 798-99.
123. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 115, at 59.
124. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); see Minnick v. Mississippi, 498
U.S. 146, 153 (1990) (holding that when a suspect requests counsel, law enforcement officials
cannot reinitiate interrogation without counsel present even if suspect has already
communicated with counsel); Godsey, supra note 116, at 806.
125. Godsey, supra note 116, at 806.
126. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is explicitly stated in the text of the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). Whereas the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel is implied from the text, and is necessary to protect the textual
right against compelled self-incrimination. See also Godsey, supra note 116, at 798 (stating
that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel differ
in substance and policy).
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all the warnings are necessary to ensure the suspect's Fifth Amendment
privilege is protected.
It should be noted that the right to have counsel present prior to
interrogation is also an important right; however, it is not as important
as the right to have counsel present during interrogation. A suspect is
not subjected to coercive tactics before interrogation because prior to
questioning the suspect is not called upon to give statements or to make
a confession. It is true that the suspect could voluntarily offer
information prior to interrogation that would hurt his case, but the
Miranda warnings do not protect a suspect who is willing to talk; they
protect a suspect from being coerced to give incriminating information.
From a practical standpoint, adding "prior to interrogation" to the
warning "you have the right to the presence of an attorney during
interrogation" would not make any difference if the suspect invokes his
right to have counsel during interrogation because once the attorney
arrives, he can consult with his client prior to questioning if he so
chooses. A Fifth Amendment violation caused by a suspect giving an
unwarned statement cannot be remedied by telling the suspect of his
right to speak to an attorney prior to interrogation, as there will still be
opportunities for the suspect to make a statement before the attorney
arrives at the station. Rather, this potential violation is remedied by
immediately advising the suspect of his rights upon the first encounter
with police and continually making him aware of these rights. While
having a lawyer present to prepare a suspect before interrogation can
undoubtedly help to protect a suspect's rights, the coercion that the
Miranda warnings seek to prevent is the coercion that occurs during the
interrogation, not before.
B. Extra Warning Necessary in Light of Davis v. United States
Advisement of the right to have counsel present during interrogation
is necessary so that a suspect can make a clear and unequivocal request
for counsel, as required by Davis v. United States.127 As an initial matter,
the Court held in Edwards v. Arizona that when a suspect expresses to
his interrogators that he does not wish to continue questioning without
counsel present, the interrogation must cease immediately." 8  The
suspect, however, cannot show hesitation or be indecisive when making
the request for counsel; in order for a suspect to invoke his right to
127. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
128. 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981).
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counsel, he must make a clear and unambiguous request.129 The
Supreme Court articulated the standard for invoking the right to counsel
prior to custodial interrogation in Davis as follows:
[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in
light of the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,
our precedents do not require the cessation of
questioning.... [The suspect] must articulate his desire
to have counsel present sufficiently clearly [so] that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an
attorney. 130
If the request does not meet this level of clarity, the questioning will
continue without counsel. 131
The standard for invoking the right to counsel can be very difficult
for a suspect to meet for several reasons. First, suspects who are
minorities, powerless in society, or poor tend to use indirect modes of
speech.'32 Indirect modes of speech are often used to avoid conflict and
include adding such words as "I think," "I guess," "maybe," and
"perhaps" to an affirmative phrase.133 For example, a suspect may say,
"I think I want a lawyer." 13 The use of the extra words by the speaker
conveys that he or she is uncertain about the statement being made,
even if he or she is not uncertain. "5  This false conveyance of
uncertainty is problematic because, under Davis, law enforcement
officials do not have to stop the interrogation when a suspect attempts
to invoke his right to counsel using an ambiguous or indirect mode of
speech. 136  Moreover, minorities and the poor are arrested on a
129. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
130. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) and Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)).
131. Id. at 462.
132. Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 261, 263, 317 (1993).
133. Id. at 276, 318.
134. See, e.g., State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, 9, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 9, 647 N.W.2d 142,
T 9 (stating that during interrogation, the defendant stated "I think maybe I need to talk to a
lawyer"); Davis, 512 U.S. at 455 (stating that during interrogation, the defendant stated
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer").




disproportionate basis, and therefore, the Davis rule creates a strong
bias against them. 137
A second reason the Davis standard is difficult to meet is because if
a suspect makes a request for counsel that the interrogators deem to be
ambiguous, the interrogators can ask clarifying questions. 138 By asking
clarifying questions, the police officers can use trickery and coercion to
dissuade the suspect from invoking his right to counsel. For example,
the officers may use clarifying questions to prompt the suspect to change
his mind, 139 or they may ask questions and act as if they do not
understand the request for counsel. 4 ' The following tape-recorded
conversation that took place in Alvarez v. Gomez is illustrative of these
tactics.
[Detective(1)]: "Do you understand those rights?"
(referring to Miranda rights)
[Defendant]: "Yes."
[Detective(1)]: "Okay. Do you wanna give up the right to
remain silent? Mario [the defendant], you wanna talk to
us about this incident?"
[Defendant]: "Can Iget an attorney right now, man?"
[Detective(1)]: "Pardon me?"
[Defendant]: "You can have attorney right now?"
137. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 358, 360 (2003). Whites account for 70.7% of total arrests and comprise 80.7% of
the total United States population, while Blacks account for 26.9% of the total amount of
arrests and make up 12.7% of the total population. Id.; see also Bruce Western et al.,
Economic Inequality and the Rise in U.S. Imprisonment 11 (Russell Sage Found., Working
Paper, 2004), available at http://www.russellsage.org/publications/workingpapers/
ineqimprisonment/document ("[P]olice may surveil and arrest the poor more frequently than
the affluent. Police partly focus their efforts in poor urban communities because more of
daily life, and illegal activity, transpires in public space.") Minorities are more likely to live
below the poverty line than whites. In 2003, the poverty rate for non-Hispanic Whites was
8.2% compared to 24.4% for Blacks, and 22.5% for Hispanics. U.S. Census Bureau News,
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income-wealth/002484.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2007).
138. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
139. WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA'S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 93 (2001). The officers might also tell the suspect that he can
help himself by cooperating. See, e.g., United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1363-64 (11th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the confession was voluntarily made when the agent told the suspect
that he could help himself by cooperating).
140. Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 449 (1999).
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[Detective(1)]: "Ah, you can have one appointed for you,
yes."
[Defendant]: "Well, like right now you got one?"
[Detective(l)]: "We don't have one here, no. There's not
one present now."
[Detective(2)]: "There will be one appointed to you at
the arraignment, ah, whether you can afford one. If you
can't one will be appointed to you by the court."
[Defendant]: "All right."
[Detective(l)]: (says something unintelligible)
[Defendant]: "I'll-I'll talk to you guys."
[Detective(l)]: "Okay. You wanna talk to us without a
lawyer here, right?"
[Defendant]: "Yeah." 1 41
After being convicted in state court of first-degree murder and car theft,
the defendant in Alvarez sought habeas relief to suppress his confession
arguing that he invoked his right to counsel.1 2 The district court denied
relief, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "thrice-
repeated questions, when considered together, constituted an
unequivocal request for an attorney," and granted relief.' 3 Even though
the court in this case ultimately held that the defendant invoked his right
to have counsel, this passage demonstrates how law enforcement
officials use clarifying questions to dissuade a defendant from invoking
his right to counsel.
Lastly, making a clear and unambiguous request for counsel is very
difficult to do when the warning is itself unclear and ambiguous. If the
suspect is not made aware of when he can have an attorney, he will not
realize that he is entitled to have an attorney present during
interrogation, and any request for an attorney may seem ambiguous.
The Davis threshold creates a double standard; the police, in some
jurisdictions, are permitted to give an ambiguous warning-"you have
141. 185 F.3d 995, 996-97 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Thompson v.
Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 770 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). After signing a valid waiver and indicating
that he wanted to make a statement, the defendant told officers "he first wanted to tell his
story to an attorney." Thompson, 601 F.2d at 769. Police officer testified to telling the
defendant "if he waited and talked to an attorney, the first thing the attorney would tell him is
not to say anything and that if he had anything that he thought we should know, that he
should go ahead and tell us." Id. at 770 n.2.
142. Alvarez, 185 F.3d at 997.
143. Id. at 998.
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the right to the presence of an attorney"-but the suspect is not entitled
to counsel when he makes an ambiguous request. Based on the
demanding standard for invoking counsel from Davis, a more precise
warning for the right to have counsel is necessary.
C. The General Warning Is Ambiguous and Misleading
The warning that the suspect has the "right to the presence of
counsel" does not adequately convey the specific right to have counsel
present during interrogation. This is because a general warning for the
right to have counsel present has no temporal element and could be
construed as meaning sometime after questioning or during trial, as trial
is the time many lay people associate with having an attorney. While a
legally trained mind, or a person with a high level of sophistication
might be able to imply the specific right to have counsel present during
interrogation from the general warning, many suspects may not be able
to make this leap in logic. This is because many criminal suspects do not
possess a high level of sophistication, or even if a suspect has the
sophistication to make this deduction, the police will most likely
intimidate and confuse the suspect so that he is not thinking clearly.
The inherent ambiguity in a general warning is illustrated in a case
from Florida where the adequacy of the Miranda warnings was at
issue.'" The suspect was warned, "You have the right to talk with a
lawyer and have a lawyer present before any questioning.' ' .5 After the
defendant gave a confession in the case, an expert met with the
defendant and questioned his understanding of the right to counsel.' 6
Specifically, the expert asked the defendant when he believed he could
have an attorney, to which the defendant responded, "only in the
courtroom. You can't have one when you're questioned because the
cops wouldn't want one. Why not? Because you might not say what
they want you to say."' 147 The expert concluded that the defendant did
not understand his right to have a lawyer with him during
interrogation. 
148
144. Roberts v. State, 874 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
145. Id. at 1226.
146. Id.
147. Id. Similarly, one scholar has noted that "the warnings are given in a very routine,
unconvincing fashion and suspects either do not believe, or refuse to believe.., that having a
lawyer will not hurt their case." Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright-line Rule" of Miranda,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 110 (1993).
148. Roberts, 874 So. 2d at 1226.
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Another example that illustrates the ambiguity of a general warning
can be found in Atwell v. United States, where the defendant was told
that he had the right to consult with an attorney "at anytime."1 49 The
court aptly recognized that "'[a]nytime' could be interpreted by an
accused, in an atmosphere of pressure from the glare of the law enforcer
and his authority, to refer to an impending trial or some time or event
other than the moment the advice was given and the interrogation
following."' 0 These examples demonstrate that an ambiguous warning
regarding the right to counsel, without more, may lead a suspect to
believe the right to counsel does not attach until after interrogation.
Despite the inherent ambiguity in the general warning, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that such a warning was constitutionally
adequate. In United States v. Frankson, the police sergeant told the
defendant, "You have the right to an attorney. If you can't afford an
attorney, the Government will get one for you."'51 At no point did the
police sergeant tell the defendant that he had the right to have an
attorney present before or during interrogation. 52 Nonetheless, the
court held that the warning was sufficient because the "right to an
attorney began immediately and continued forward in time without
qualification."'53  In other words, the warning implicitly advised the
defendant of his right to have counsel present during interrogation. As
illustrated above, this logic is fatally flawed. While a lawyer or judge
may be able to infer that the general warning continues forward in time,
a suspect sitting in an isolated interrogation room most likely will not.
Sometimes the police will warn a suspect that he has the right to
have counsel present prior to questioning, but will not warn the suspect
of his right to have counsel present during questioning. 4 While this
warning eliminates the ambiguity concern, it is extremely misleading. If
the defendant is told he can have an attorney before questioning, this
implies that there is no right to an attorney during questioning. This
follows the logic of "if one, then not the other." Warning the suspect of
his right to have counsel present before questioning is more dangerous
than the general warning because it misleads the suspect and puts a limit
on the right to have an attorney. If a suspect invokes his right to have
149. 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968).
150. Id.
151. 83 F.3d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1996).
152. Id. at 82.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Bland, 908 F.2d 471, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 614 (9th Cir. 1984).
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counsel present prior to questioning he would undoubtedly find out
from the attorney of his right to have the attorney present during
interrogation. However, the suspect may never invoke this right
because he may think that he will not derive any benefit from an
attorney's advice prior to interrogation, and will, therefore, decide to
forfeit the right altogether.
D. Deception in the Interrogation Process
The police often use deception in order to induce a waiver of rights
and to obtain a confession. 55 To begin, a suspect may waive his
Miranda rights as long as the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.156 For a waiver to be valid, it must be "made with a full
awareness of... the nature of the right being abandoned." '157 Therefore,
if the suspect is not made aware of his right to have counsel present
during interrogation, the waiver is not made knowingly and intelligently,
and the statements made will (or at least should) be inadmissible.
The Miranda warnings are often recited to a suspect in a way that
seeks to induce a waiver without an actual contemplation of the rights."5
For example, an interrogator may read the suspect his rights in a way
that de-emphasizes their importance.5 9 This technique is accomplished
by reading the rights in a manner that portrays them as an "unimportant
bureaucratic ritual," which implies that the warnings do not warrant the
suspect's attention.' 6° Another effective technique law enforcement
155. Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1168 (2001).
156. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Waiver cannot be presumed based
on the suspect's silence after the warnings are given; rather, the Court requires some
affirmative conduct indicating the suspect understands his rights and that he agrees to waive
them. See id. at 475; see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (stating
explicit statement of waiver is not necessary because in some circumstances, "waiver can be
clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated"). Notably, many
police departments use a waiver form that requires the suspect to initial next to each of the
warnings to indicate that he understands and waives each right. DAVID E. ZULAWSKI &
DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION 37
(1993).
157. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). Moran sets forth a two-pronged test to
determine whether a waiver is valid. Id. The first prong requires that the waiver be made
voluntarily and free from coercion. Id. The second prong, stated above, requires that the
suspect be made fully aware of his rights. Id.
158. WHITE, supra note 139, at 78-91.
159. Id. at 79-80.
160. Id. at 79. One commentator has observed that "the warnings are given in a very
routine, unconvincing fashion and suspects either do not believe, or refuse to believe... that
having a lawyer will not hurt their case." Marcus, supra note 147, at 110. Another prominent
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officials use is telling the suspect that by waiving his rights he will have a
valuable opportunity to tell his version of the story."' Or, the
interrogating officer may try to induce the suspect to waive his right to
counsel even after the suspect has requested counsel by stopping the
interrogation and leaving the suspect alone for a period of time until he
changes his mind. 6 2 Because the use of these techniques will most likely
not result in a constitutional violation (assuming the requisite warnings
are given),' the need for a detailed warning for the right to counsel is
heightened. If the precise warning is given, the suspect can at least
contemplate the full extent of his rights.
Once officers have secured a waiver of rights, they will often use
deceptive tactics in order to secure a confession.' 6' Using deception to
obtain confessions is a dangerous technique because it can lead to false
confessions.165 Deceptive tactics include the following: interrogators
telling the suspect that non-existent eyewitnesses have identified him,
telling the suspect that at-large accomplices have given statements
against him, or showing the suspect a fabricated lab report linking him
to the crime."" Having counsel present during interrogation helps to
protect the suspect's Fifth Amendment right by limiting the use of these
unethical techniques.
scholar and former public defender stated that "the police are not an effective means of
informing suspects both of the existence and extent of their privilege against self-
incrimination and of their right to consult with counsel before they make any statements."
Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good For the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826,1827-28 (1987).
161. WHITE, supra note 139, at 81-87; see also Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768,
770 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). Defendant told police officers that he wanted to talk to an attorney,
and in response, the police officers told defendant that if he spoke to an attorney he would
not be able to tell them his side of the story. Thompson, 601 F.2d at 770 n2.
162. WHITE, supra note 139, at 91.
163. Id. at 81. "[T]he government can establish a valid Miranda waiver by simply
demonstrating that the suspect understood the meaning of the Miranda warnings; it need not
show that he understood the consequences of waiving his rights." Id. (citing Colorado v.
Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) and Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
164. Magid, supra note 155, at 1168 ("Virtually all interrogations-or at least virtually all
successful interrogations-involve some deception.").
165. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 979, 983 (1996). False confessions occur
with "substantial frequency," and significantly contribute to wrongful convictions. Id.;
WHITE, supra note 139, at 153, 160-79 (giving examples of police-induced false confessions).
But see Magid, supra note 155, at 1197 (arguing deception is often necessary to obtain
confessions and using deception leads to convictions, which benefits society).




The Supreme Court has consistently eschewed bright-line rules when
it comes to the Miranda warnings. 16 In Miranda, as explained above,
the Court set forth a list of warnings that must be given to a suspect
subjected to custodial interrogation; however, the Court stated that the
fully effective equivalent of the warnings would suffice."6 This formula
has worked well for all of the warnings, except for one-the right to
have counsel present during interrogation. Telling the defendant that
he has "the right to the presence of an attorney," or that he can have an
attorney at "anytime" is not the functional equivalent of telling him that
he has "the right to have an attorney present during interrogation." In
contrast, telling a suspect that he "does not have to say anything" is the
functional equivalent of telling him he has "the right to remain silent."'69
Similarly, telling a defendant that "anything he says can be used against
him in court" is the fully effective equivalent of telling him "any
statements he makes can be used as evidence against him." However,
"the right to the presence of an attorney" is ambiguous and imprecise. 7 0
The Miranda Court purposely did not make a rigid, inflexible rule
requiring a verbatim reading of the warnings listed in the opinion for
several reasons. First, the Court did not want criminals to escape
conviction where the warnings given served the policies behind the
warnings and protected the suspect from being forced to give
statements.17 ' Second, the Court did not want to drastically limit the
effectiveness of police interrogation.1 72 Lastly, the Court did not want to
limit efforts of the states and Congress to "search for increasingly
effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual."' 173 In other
words, the Court did not require strict adherence because it foresaw the
states and Congress providing extra protections, not fewer.1 74 None of
these reasons stand in the way of the rule proposed in this Comment.
167. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
168. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
169. See United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir. 1970) (warning defendant
that "he need not make any statement" was the equivalent of warning defendant of his "right
to remain silent").
170. See supra Part 1V.C.
171. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 481.
172. See id. at 481 ("[O]ur decision does not in any way preclude police from carrying
out their traditional investigatory functions.").




Many proposals have been put forth in scholarly literature seeking to
enhance the protections provided by the Miranda warnings or, at least,
to restore the force they had when the Court announced the rights in
1966. These proposals include videotaping all custodial
interrogations, 17 "a per se rule prohibiting law enforcement authorities
from interrogating a suspect in custody who has not consulted with an
attorney,"'7 6 and not permitting any deviation from the exact language
of the Miranda warnings. 7 While all of these proposals are noble
attempts to bring credibility to the interrogation process, such drastic
measures are not only unnecessary, but their implementation would be
burdensome, expensive, or both. The following proposal complies with
the dictates of Miranda while also complying with subsequent cases that
have stated a verbatim recital of the Miranda warnings is not required.
A. The Rule
This Comment proposes the following rule: Unless a suspect subject
to custodial interrogation is explicitly informed of his right to have
counsel present during interrogation prior to questioning, any
statements made by the suspect will be inadmissible at trial in the
prosecution's case-in-chief.'78  Stated differently, the right-to-an-
attorney warning must include a temporal element alerting the suspect
of his right to have counsel present during interrogation.
This rule does not require police officers to repeat verbatim that the
suspect has the "right to have an attorney present during interrogation";
rather, what is important is the temporal element the rule adds to the
right-to-the-presence-of-an-attorney warning. The warning can be
175. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 165, at 1120; see also Godsey, supra note 116, at 810.
Several state high courts have required that custodial interrogation be recorded. See State v.
Jerrell, 2005 WI 105, 1 3, 238 Wis. 2d 145, % 3, 699 N.W.2d 110, 3 (requiring electronic
recording of custodial interrogation of juveniles); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.
1994) ("[A]lI custodial interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of
those rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible and must be
recorded when questioning occurs at a place of detention."); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156,
1159 (Alaska 1985) (requiring electronic recording when custodial interrogation occurs in a
"place of detention" and when feasible). Several states have required recording of custodial
interrogations by statute. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 968.073(2) (2005); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/103-2.1 (2003); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon 2001).
176. Ogletree, supra note 160, at 1830.
177. Marcus, supra note 147, at 129.
178. Consistent with prior precedent, statements obtained in violation of this rule would
still be admissible for impeachment purposes, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224
(1971), and the "fruits" of the statements would be admissible as well, see Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 305, 309 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). See supra Part II.B.
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adequately stated in many different ways, including: "You have the right
to have an attorney present while you are being questioned,"'7 9 "You
have the right to speak to an attorney beginning now and continuing
through the duration of questioning," or "You have the right to have an
attorney with you throughout the interrogation." Because different
formulations of this warning exist, the rule does not contradict Supreme
Court precedent that states the Miranda warnings are not a rigid
formula. 1
80
As an initial matter, implementing the proposed bright-line rule
would not be a burden on law enforcement officials because it requires
adding only two words to the standard Miranda warnings-"during
interrogation." In addition, law enforcement officials often read the
Miranda warnings off of a card prior to interrogation, so adding two
words to the card would be extremely easy and not onerous.
One could argue that this proposed rule is already the rule of the
Court, and that this proposal will not change existing law. This rule,
however, differs from existing precedent in that it requires strict
compliance with one of the Miranda warnings: the right to have counsel
present during interrogation. Moreover, this rule is necessary in light of
the fact that several circuits have not required law enforcement officials
to make suspects aware of their right to have counsel present during
interrogation,' a right that is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The
rule, therefore, augments the Miranda protections, or at least calls for
the Court to reaffirm precedent that has not been followed.
It should be noted that adding "prior to" in addition to "during"
questioning would certainly add an extra level of protection and would
not further complicate the rule. However, a court adopting this bright-
line rule need not go that far, as the Miranda warnings were intended to
prevent against the evils that occur during interrogation, not before it.'8
B. Benefits
The bright-line rule would benefit the entire criminal justice system.
First, police officers would benefit from knowing exactly how they must
advise the suspect of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Police do
179. See United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 978 (11th Cir. 1982). Suspect was
warned "you can have your attorney present while we interrogate you," and the court held
this complied with Miranda. Id.
180. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 436.
181. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Part IV.A.
1038 [90:1009
MIRANDA WARNING
not want the statements they obtain during interrogation to be deemed
inadmissible by a court based on inadequate warnings. Therefore,
requiring police to alert the suspect of his right to have counsel present
during interrogation, and not leaving what warnings are given up to
officers' discretion, will help to ensure that the Miranda warnings are
constitutionally adequate.
Second, suspects benefit because they are explicitly made aware of
their right to have counsel present during interrogation, a right that is
essential to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. In addition, if the Supreme Court adopted the bright-line
rule, its adoption would ensure that all criminal suspects across the
country receive the same warnings: The rights that a suspect is made
aware of should not depend on what state or part of the country he lives
in.
Some critics of this proposal will argue that alerting a suspect of his
right to have counsel present during interrogation will make the criminal
justice system less efficient because more suspects will invoke their right
to counsel, and as a result, fewer confessions will be obtained. However,
this concern, while valid on its face, is unfounded in empirical evidence.
A 1996 study from Salt Lake City, Utah, on the effects of the Miranda
warnings discovered that 83.7% of suspects waive their Miranda rights
and talk to the police during custodial interrogation. 83 Importantly, the
warnings that were read to the suspects in this study included a warning
that complies with the rule proposed in this Comment. The warning
stated, "You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present
with you while you are being questioned."'" Only 7% of the suspects in
this study invoked their right to counsel.'85 In a similar study on the
effects of Miranda warnings conducted in the Berkeley, California,
police department, 8 6 78.3% of the suspects waived their Miranda
rights.187 This study did not indicate the precise warnings that were
given, but the article explained that the interrogators read the Miranda
183. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical
Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 859 (1996).
184. Id. at 888.
185. Id. at 860 tbl.3.
186. Leo, supra note 120, at 268. The author of this study did not reveal the location
where the study took place. Id. However, later articles have revealed the location. See, e.g.,
Mandy DeFilippo, You Have the Right to Better Safeguards: Looking Beyond Miranda in the
New Millennium, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637, 653 (2001).
187. Leo, supra note 120, at 276.
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warnings "verbatim from a standard form."' 88 The data from these
studies suggests that adding "during interrogation" to the right to
consult with an attorney will not result in substantially more, or even
any more, suspects invoking their right to counsel.
Third, the bright-line rule will benefit judicial economy because
fewer challenges will be brought based on the adequacy of the warnings,
and the challenges that are brought will be quickly and easily decided.
Without this bright-line rule, whether a court deems Miranda warnings
constitutionally adequate in a given case is a fact-intensive inquiry. As
stated by the Court in Duckworth, "[t]he inquiry is simply whether the
warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by
Miranda.' '" 8 9 The Court's declaration that this inquiry is a simple one
was quite optimistic, and in reality has not been so simple. The court
system will benefit from the rule because judges will not have to try to
determine if the defendant was made aware of his right to have counsel
present during interrogation through a warning that is a "fully effective
equivalent" of the explicit warning, or if an ambiguous warning
conveyed to the suspect his right to have counsel present during
interrogation. With this rule in place, the inquiry will be a simple one:
the warning either includes a temporal element alerting the suspect of
his right to have counsel present during interrogation or it does not.
Oftentimes, the same court will find one warning adequate and
another, almost identical warning inadequate based on small or even
nonexistent differences, which exemplifies the present difficulty in
determining whether warnings are adequate. For example, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal of Florida reviewed two different Miranda
warnings in two different cases that were almost identical, yet came to
different conclusions.'O In Roberts v. State, a police officer read the
defendant his Miranda warnings, which included, "[Y]ou have the right
to talk with a lawyer and have a lawyer present before any
questioning.'' The court held that this warning did not comply with
Miranda because it did not inform the defendant of his right to have a
lawyer present during interrogation. '9' The court went on to explain,
"Florida courts have consistently interpreted Miranda as requiring
188. Id.
189. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (alterations in original) (quoting
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981)).
190. See also supra Part III.B.




notification that a person in custody has a right to have counsel present
not only before interrogation but during interrogation as well."' 93
Less than two years later, the same court heard a case en banc
involving a very similar Miranda warning, and, in a 5-4 decision,
reached the opposite conclusion it had reached in Roberts. In Canete v.
State, the police officer told the defendant, "[Y]ou have the right to
speak to an attorney, have an attorney present here before we make any
questions."' 94 After this warning, the police officer then told the
defendant, "[i]f you decide to answer the questions now, without an
attorney present, you still have the right not to answer my questions at
any time until you can speak with an attorney."' 95 The court recognized
that the first warning did not alert the defendant that he had the right to
have counsel present during interrogation, but interpreted the second
warning to be the functional equivalent of that right. 96 According to the
court, the defendant could infer from the totality of the warnings that he
had the right to have counsel present during interrogation, and
therefore the warnings complied with Miranda.""
Even assuming that the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
properly distinguished the two cases in a manner consistent with
Miranda and the Fifth Amendment, this type of judicial hair-splitting is
a waste of judicial resources, creates unclear precedent, and leads to
inconsistent results, demonstrating the need for a bright-line rule.
Under the rule proposed in this Comment, the warnings in both cases
would be constitutionally inadequate because neither warning explicitly
alerted the suspect of his right to have an attorney present during
interrogation.
Adding this warning will not lead the Court down the "slippery
slope" of having to continually add more warnings. The Supreme Court
has already required this warning, and adding it would only reaffirm
established precedent. Whereas adding, for example, "you have the
right to remain silent during interrogation" has never been required by
the Court and would be superfluous. Moreover, adding "during
interrogation" to the right to the presence of an attorney warning is
necessary because, as stated above, this right serves as the gatekeeper to
193. Id. at 1227.
194. 921 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc). The police officers gave
the defendant his warnings in Spanish, and the warnings were translated into English in the
opinion. Id. at 687.
195. Id. at 688.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 689.
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the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination."9
Therefore, although adopting the bright-line rule could lead to requests
for additional warnings, these requests could be easily dismissed on the
grounds that the Court has never required the warnings, and that extra
warnings are not necessary to protect the suspect's Fifth Amendment
privilege.
VI. CONCLUSION
Unless a suspect is told that he has the right to have counsel present
during interrogation, the suspect is not made aware of the full extent of
the Fifth Amendment protections available to him. While confessions
and statements made by a suspect during custodial interrogation are a
vital part of the criminal justice system, the procedural safeguards that
the Miranda warnings provide, specifically the right to have counsel
present during interrogation, are necessary for the criminal justice
system to maintain its legitimacy. The general warning that the suspect
has the right to an attorney is ambiguous, as the right could attach at
several different times, and thus a temporal element must be added to
the warning--during interrogation. Moreover, if law enforcement
officials give the extra warning, they will increase the likelihood that a
confession will be deemed admissible without increasing the likelihood
that a suspect will actually invoke his right to counsel, as most suspects
waive their Miranda rights regardless of how the rights are presented.
In light of the circuit split and Davis, which requires that a suspect make
a clear and unambiguous request for counsel in order to properly invoke
his right, the Court should clarify that the right-to-an-attorney warning
must include the words "during interrogation," or a similar temporal
element. The United States Supreme Court, as well as other courts that
have not already done so, should require that a defendant be made
aware of his right to have counsel present during interrogation, because
to do otherwise promotes, or continues, a race to the bottom where
police departments will create vague and misleading warnings to
circumvent the Miranda protections.
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198. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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